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Abstract
Political behaviour increasingly takes place on digital platforms, where people are presented
with a range of social information—real-time feedback about the behaviour of peers and ref-
erence groups—which can stimulate (or depress) participation. This social information is
hypothesized to impact the distribution of political activity, stimulating participation in mobili-
zations that are increasing in popularity, and depressing participation in those that appear to
be less popular, leading to a non-normal distribution. Changes to these platforms can gener-
ate natural experiments allowing for an estimate of the impact of different kinds of social
information on participation. This paper tests the hypothesis that social information shapes
the distribution of political mobilizations by examining the introduction of trending information
to the homepage of the UK government petition platform. The introduction of the trending
feature did not increase the overall number of signatures per day, but the distribution of
signatures across petitions changed significantly—the most popular petitions gained more
signatures at the expense of those with fewer signatories. We further find significant differ-
ences between petitions trending at different ranks on the homepage. This evidence sug-
gests that the ubiquity of trending information on digital platforms is introducing instability
into political markets, as has been shown for cultural markets. As well as highlighting the
importance of digital design in shaping political behaviour, the findings suggest that a non-
negligible group of individuals visit the homepage of the site looking for petitions to sign,
without having decided the issues they wish to support in advance. These ‘aimless petition-
ers’ are particularly susceptible to changes in social information.
Introduction
Online behaviour is characterised by non-normal distributions. From the number of hyper-
links pointing to a website [1], to the number of followers on Twitter [2] or the number of
views of a video, many empirical distributions online appear to be heavy-tailed or exhibit a
power law [3–6]. These distributions are not described well by their ‘typical’ or mean value as a
large fraction of the points are very far from the mean. Thus, while the average candidate for
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parliament in the UK 2015 General Election had a mean 3,800 followers on Twitter, some can-
didates had none while others had over 100 thousand, with one having over one million fol-
lowers [2]. This pattern does not resemble normal, bell-shaped distributions where extreme
values are rare. The average American male is 180 centimetres, and while some males are taller
or shorter no one is extremely far from this height [4]. While the power law is perhaps the
most well-known heavy-tailed distribution, log-normal, exponential, and poisson distributions
are also all heavy-tailed. The characterization of an empirical distribution as specifically follow-
ing a power law is complicated (see [4] for a fuller discussion); so, we use the more general cat-
egory of heavy-tailed in this article.
Heavy-tailed distributions are not exclusive to online behaviour—the distribution of phone
calls received per person, the frequencies of words in novels, and the populations of cities,
towns, and villages in various countries have all been characterised as heavy-tailed [4]. How-
ever, heavy-tailed distributions appear to be particularly common online [3–6]. Baraba´si et al.
[7] suggest these distributions arise in online networks through the combination of two factors
(1) continuous growth and (2) new entities attaching preferentially to existing entities that are
already well connected (or popular). For example, creators of new webpages are likely to link
to existing, popular webpages thus reinforcing the popularity of those webpages and leading to
a distribution where a small number have many incoming links (are very popular) while most
webpages have only a small number of incoming links. A tacit assumption of this model is that
popularity is known or easily observed, which is much more likely to be true in a digital set-
ting. Offline it may be difficult to observe what a large number of other people are doing. In
contrast, many online platforms clearly indicate how many other people have already liked,
followed, retweeted, signed, or otherwise undertaken various actions. This information on
what others are doing or have done is known as social information and has a long history in
social psychology [8, 9].
One reason then that we might expect heavy-tailed distributions to be particularly common
online is the increasing ease with which social information is available. Applying the model of
preferential attachment, a citizen looking to sign a petition would be most likely to sign an
already popular petition, and someone looking to follow a politician (other than their repre-
sentative) would be likely to choose one with many followers. Increasing the ease with which
citizens can find the most popular petitions should lead to even more extreme values with a
smaller number of petitions capturing an even larger proportion of signatures to all petitions.
While the act of voting itself remains relatively free of social information as each citizen casts a
ballot independently, political campaigning and mobilization—and indeed all activities that
lead up to any political activity including voting—have undergone a dramatic increase in solic-
itation information [10]. The signing of petitions is an apt example: when petition signing was
largely paper-based and distributed, it was difficult for someone considering signing a petition
to know exactly how many other people had already signed it. Today, digital petition platforms
prominently show the current number of signatories each petition has. Although we do not
know the distribution of signatures across offline petitions (because in general, there is no
record of the ones that failed), we do have substantial evidence from our earlier work to sug-
gest that the distribution of signatures across petitions in the US and the UK is leptokurtic,
rather than normal [10].
If social information is the key to the type of distributions that emerge online, then it will be
key to understanding the nature of political mobilization, which increasingly takes place in
digital settings (see [11]) and therefore under conditions of greater social information. In fact,
there is evidence that distributions of political mobilizations are, like so many other digital
activities, indeed heavy-tailed. So it could be that the influence of social information could ulti-
mately help to explain the rapidity in the rise of new social movements and the fast-moving
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nature of the political and policy agendas in the twenty-first century [10]. Changes to the
design of digital platforms provide a valuable opportunity to isolate and understand these
social information effects on political behaviour, allowing us to test the hypothesis that social
information drives non-normal distributions in political mobilization. Such changes create the
conditions for a natural experiment: visitors to the site just before and after the change experi-
ence it as if it were random [12]. Under these conditions, changes in political behaviour before
and after a re-design can be directly attributed to the re-design. This paper analyses the effect
of one such change—the introduction of trending information on the homepage of the UK
government petition platform—and its impact on petition signing. It uses data pertaining to
Internet-based mobilizations around petitions, generated from the government petition plat-
form in the UK, which was developed by the UK Cabinet Office for the incoming Coalition
Government in 2010, launched in August 2011, and discontinued in 2015 ahead of the UK
General Election that year (to be replaced by a new version hosted by Parliament). The data
collected on the site since its launch provide digital trace data [13] on this popular form of
political participation. Although the data is not mammoth in size, it does have many of the
attributes of so-called ‘big data’: it is real-time, transactional, and represents an entire popula-
tion rather than a sample.
In this article we first review previous research on social information and participation and
relate it to online settings. Second, we provide some background on petitioning as a form of
collective action and outline the distinctive features of the petition platform we examine here.
Third, we present the petition data and analyse it with interrupted time series analysis and a
regression discontinuity design. We discuss the key findings from the data, which suggest that
users are influenced by the trending information. To conclude, we use site analytics data from
the petition platform itself to explain the empirical observations and discuss the implications
of our findings for research into political participation in digital settings (e.g., [14, 15]).
Social information and digital media
The term social information originates from social psychology where social information pro-
cessing refers to the study of the informational and social environments within which individ-
ual behaviour occurs and to which it adapts [8, 9]. Social information helps people decide what
they are going to do with reference to a wider social group, which has the potential to activate
people’s social norms. Potential participants construe this information as representing the
behaviour of a ‘generalised other,’ or a social aggregate [16], and take it into account when
they are deciding whether and how to participate. Social information has been shown to affect
charitable giving and willingness to participate in public goods provision (see [17–22]). Econo-
mists have studied the effects of social information on people’s willingness to undertake pro-
social behaviours, in particular in making charitable donations, where cooperation that is
dependent on social information giving evidence of the contributions of others has been
labelled conditional cooperation. Social information may crowd out contributions or crowd
them in, with evidence pointing to the latter because of conformity, social norms, and reci-
procity (see [21]). People are more likely to contribute to a campaign if they are provided with
information that other people are also doing the same, and this effect increases with larger
numbers of additional participants [21, 23]. Researchers have also shown that people are likely
to increase their contributions (by donating more money, for example) if they know that other
people are increasing the size of their commitments [22, 24]. In sociology and political science,
experimental studies have uncovered the importance of social information on people’s willing-
ness to contribute to public goods by undertaking activities such as recycling [20, 25, 26] and
voting [27, 28]. Social information provides a powerful signal of viability for a mobilization,
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evidence of whether or not it has reached or will reach critical mass [29] and hence the poten-
tial benefits of joining, thereby altering the incentives of individuals to participate.
When social information is provided precisely and in real-time, as facilitated by social
media, we expect that these effects on mobilization will be all the more profound and intracta-
ble. For example, we might expect to see in a political context the same kind of effects observed
in cultural markets, where Duncan Watts and colleagues [30, 31] carried out a series of experi-
ments to show how changes to real-time information feedback about cultural artefacts (songs)
changed the way that people viewed their qualities, leading popular songs to become more
popular and unpopular ones less so. In the context of online mobilization, social information
if presented as a large unit, such as a million signatures, can act like a nudge [32], which can
encourage participation.
Furthermore, social media and mobile technologies reduce the transaction costs of politi-
cal participation: they facilitate ‘micro-donations’ of time, effort and money towards political
causes, ease the making of small monetary donations to political causes (texting a keyword to
donate £3 to a disaster relief effort, for example), and extend the lower end of the ‘ladder’ of
participation. As the costs of participation fall, the cost-benefit analysis facing someone
deciding whether to participate changes [11], and social information is likely to be propor-
tionately more important an influence when deciding whether to make such a micro-dona-
tion, as other influences diminish. Indeed, recent research investigating the relationship
between Internet use and participation has shown that where costs of participation are very
low, interest in politics reduces in importance as a causal factor of participation and that
skilled Internet users do not need to be motivated or interested in politics in order to partici-
pate online [14].
In the next section, we outline the changing form of political participation in online set-
tings, in particular the rise of petitioning, which forms the context of our study.
Petitions as political mobilizations
Signing petitions has long been one of the more popular political activities, leading the field for
participatory acts outside voting, and with other social benefits such as civic mindedness [33]
ascribed to it in addition to its potential to bring about policy change. In the UK, the right to
petition the King goes back to medieval times. Petitions were widely used by the 18th century
and were a key mechanism in the campaign for parliamentary reform in the early 19th century
[34], when petitioning was a popular activity in the US [35, 36]. After a period of decline
through the 20th century, petitioning received renewed interest in the 21st, with the availabil-
ity of electronic petitions that could be created, signed, and disseminated on the Internet and,
more recently, social media. Although there are start-up costs in getting to know the platform
for people who initiate petitions, they can find supporters easily, rather than having to canvass
them door-to-door or approach people in the street. For those wishing to sign petitions, the
search costs are far lower: they may sign a petition instantly on receipt of an email or post on a
social networking site, or go to one of the large number of petition platforms and look for a
petition to sign, rather than having to wait until they encounter a petition in the course of
other activities. Furthermore, every petition signer is now potentially also a petition organizer
given the ease with which petitions can be disseminated to one’s contacts via social media.
With these reduced transactional costs and the ease of coordination, petitions have been very
popular in the age of social media, one of a growing portfolio of Internet-based democratic
innovations [37]. Both governments and NGOs, such as Avaaz [38] and 38 Degrees, have
made widespread use of petitions and accordingly have received accolades for their democratic
contribution by academic commentators [39, 40]. A growing number of governments have
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implemented petition platforms, notably the UK, the US and Germany. While petitions create
no binding obligations for governments, several petitions have had large policy impact. One
notable petition on road pricing in the UK received 1.8 million signatures in 2007 and is widely
regarded as a key reason for the government’s policy reversal. A petition in the United States
on cell/mobile phone unlocking lead to the passing of new legislation ensuring consumers on
all networks can unlock their phones [41]. Political scientists have looked at the German peti-
tion platforms [42, 43] and UK petition platforms [34, 44, 45], and others have examined peti-
tioning behaviour and activism, in particular exploring whether a small number of highly
active people are driving growth in signatures or whether activity is more distributed across
society at large [46–48].
The version of the petition platform that we investigate here was set up by the UK Cabinet
Office and the Government Digital Service in 2011, when it replaced an earlier site operated by
No. 10 Downing Street website, which received more than 8 million signatures from over 5
million unique email addresses over the course of its lifetime from November 2006 until 4
April 2011 [49]. The Cabinet Office launched the new petition site in August that year, initially
on the direct.gov portal (which eventually became the gov.uk portal in the autumn). Each peti-
tion created on the site represents a focal point for a possible mobilization of potential signato-
ries, which varied from less than a handful to hundreds of thousands.
Our previous work examined large-scale data generated from this UK platform to under-
stand the ecology of these petition-mobilizations, and analysed the growth curves of successful
petitions, identifying early, rapid growth as being critical for any kind of success [10, 50] and
highlighting the heavy-tailed or leptokurtic distributions we discussed in the introduction.
Related work has also analysed the distribution of time between signatures to petitions [51].
This study is the first to take an experimental approach to test the effect of alternative platform
designs on petitioning behaviour in the wild, using large-scale data generated from the plat-
form itself. By testing the effect of a design change that introduced trending information, we
contribute to understanding of how different presentations of social information feed into the
distribution of political mobilization in digital settings.
Social information and popular petitions
All versions of the UK government petition platform have displayed social information, in
terms of the number of other people who had signed any given petition. It has always been
possible to sort the list of petitions by popularity that is, by the number of signatures, and
indeed popularity has been the default sorting order since the Cabinet Office version of the site
launched. In March 2012, social information was emphasised when a change was made to the
site to show trending petitions on the homepage: a list of the six most popular petitions in
terms of total number of signatures within the last hour (Fig 1). This change meant that these
petitions were flagged for attention to any visitor to the homepage, with social information
automatically provided—regardless of whether the visitor sought it out or not—and acting as a
potential driver for signature growth. Therefore, this change to the platform provided the
opportunity to test the hypothesis that social information of this kind (that is, an indicator of
popularity and rate of change, given that the number of signatures in an hour indicates move-
ment on a petition) acts to encourage participation for those petitions for which it is provided.
We would expect that those petitions shown on the homepage as trending to have received dis-
proportionately more signatures compared to those not shown.
Such expectations about feedback depend on the shape of social responses in collective
action on the Internet. From the theoretical discussion reviewed earlier, we consider two alter-
native hypotheses:
How digital design shapes political participation: A natural experiment with social information
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H1. Trending information will lead to more overall signatures on the petition platform.
H2. Overall signatures on the petition platform will remain constant, but trending petitions
will receive more signatures at the expense of non-trending petitions.
We can test these hypotheses because, as indicated above, we have collected all the signatory
data for the platform before and after the change. This date-range creates a natural experiment
on the platform, allowing us to examine behaviour before and after the change in a regression
discontinuity design.
Data and methods
Online petitions are created, disseminated, circulated, and presented online. They are regularly
disseminated online via social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter. Although
policy-makers may discuss responses in offline contexts, such responses are disseminated
online. So both successful and unsuccessful mobilizations that form around petitions leave a
complete digital audit trail of the real (rather than reported) actions of the entire population of
signers of each petition, however large or small. In contrast, paper-based petitions left a rather
incomplete record given that unsuccessful petitions not presented to the government or legis-
lature were unlikely to be recorded, although successful ones can now be transcribed to digital
form and analysed (see [36] for such an analysis of anti-slavery petitions in the US).
When the Cabinet Office petition site was launched in August 2011, we programmed an
automatic script to scrape it every hour, recording the number of overall signatures to date on
each active petition. In addition, we collected the title, text, launch date, and other attributes of
each petition. Our dataset contains hourly data points for all the petitions (19,789) submitted
to the site between 5 August 2011 and 22 February 2013. We also have anonymous website
analytics data from December 2012 to April 2014, which is after the site redesign in March
Fig 1. Left: A screenshot of the homepage on 27 March 2012 (no trending information). Right: A screenshot of the homepage on 30 March 2012. A list of trending
petitions has been added. Both screenshots are from the Internet Archive.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g001
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2012. These data made it possible to examine the different patterns of growth in the 20,000
mobilization curves that we have data for and identify the distinctive characteristic of those
mobilizations that succeed and those that fail. Such an analysis can tell us a great deal about
petitioning and indeed, about the nature of collective action itself in a digital world.
Our previous work has analysed data from multiple UK government petition platforms to
show that most petitions fail [50, 52]. Consistently across the datasets, only 5 per cent of peti-
tions obtained 500 signatures (sufficient to gain an official response on the first platform). On
the second platform, which we study here, 4 per cent received 1,000 signatures or more, 0.7
per cent attained the 10,000 signatures required to receive an official response, and 0.1 per cent
attained the 100,000 signatures required for a parliamentary debate. We also found that the
first day was crucial in achieving any kind of success on both platforms [52]. Any petition
receiving 100,000 signatures after three months needed to have obtained 3,000 within the first
10 hours on average. To quantify further the fast decay in the popularity of the petitions, we
modelled the number of signatures over time using a modulated multiplicative process and
observed that the modulating parameter, which we labelled the ‘outreach factor,’ decayed very
rapidly, reducing to 0.1% within 10 hours of the launch of a petition [52].
As noted above, in March 2012, the UK Cabinet Office introduced a change to the petition
site that altered the information environment of prospective petitioners, by introducing a
‘trending petitions’ facility on the homepage, providing potential signatories with a new kind
of social information about which petitions were currently popular and how many other peo-
ple had signed each of these petition. We assume that such a change is exogenous to political
participation itself; so, the time directly before and after the change is as if random. The fact
that we captured data from this site both before and after this change provides us with a natural
experiment (avoiding ‘bundling’ problems [12]) whereby we can test the effect of this change
using a variety of methods, including interrupted series and regression discontinuity design.
Results
First, we tested the hypothesis (H1) that the trending facility would increase the overall num-
ber of signatures on the site, by attracting more visitors to the most popular petitions. In Fig 2,
we plot the cumulative number of signatures to all petitions on the site over time from 1 Janu-
ary 2012 to 1 July 2012. We fit a piecewise linear regression model with one unknown break
point following [53, 54] and find the best fit is achieved with a break point on 26 March 2012,
which approximately aligns with the introduction of the trending petition feature on the site.
The estimated slope for the model before the change is 11,846 signatures per day (standard
error 77), while after the change the slope is estimated at 7,308 signatures per day (standard
error 64). Contrary to our first hypothesis (H1), the trending information did not lead to more
overall signatures on the platform. We found the results were sensitive to the exact start and
end dates within which we examine the data. Looking at larger windows starting before
November 2011 or ending after July 2012 showed the best location for the breakpoint at ear-
lier/later dates. Regardless, the results never indicated an increase in the number of daily signa-
tures as a result of the trending information.
If the introduction of the trending petitions facility did not increase the overall number of
signatures on the site, did it change the distribution of signatures across petitions as predicted
by hypothesis H2? Do the most popular petitions that appear in the trending box become
more popular than they would have been had the facility not been introduced? We attempted
to answer these questions by quantifying the distribution of the daily signatures to petitions
(Fig 3). It is already evident from Fig 3 that the distribution becomes more skewed with more
extreme values at the right end.
How digital design shapes political participation: A natural experiment with social information
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To investigate the difference between the distributions of signatures further, we calculated
the Gini coefficients for the distribution of signatures over petitions for one-week time win-
dows. The weekly coefficients are shown in Fig 4. The thick red line shows the average over
periods of three months before and after the change and the width of the pink area corre-
sponds to the standard deviation between the weekly coefficients in each period. After the
trending petitions facility was introduced, the Gini coefficient increased significantly from
0.85 to 0.92 (p< 0.0001 with Student’s t-test).
We can conclude then that the introduction of trending petitions on the homepage changed
the distribution of signatures across petitions. The increase in the Gini coefficient indicates
that signatures were more concentrated on a small number of petitions after the design change
than they were before. The overall number of open petitions was always increasing (as peti-
tions are open one year and at the time of the change the site was less than one year old).
That said, we know that attention is most focused on new petitions, and the number of new
petitions being created was decreasing during this time. This is probably the decay in the
Fig 2. The cumulative number of signatures to all petitions on the platform. A piecewise linear function achieves the best fit with a break point at 26 March 2012
(vertical dashed line), which aligns approximately with the introduction of the trending information on the homepage. Contrary to H1, the number of signatures per
day did not increase after the introduction of the trending information.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g002
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novelty of the website. There was a huge spike in activity right as the site launches (autumn
2011) and then a gradual decay in petition creation through the time period we study (spring
2012). We are interested in the effect of the interruption to these long-run trends.
The change in the Gini coefficient indicates that the distribution of signatures across peti-
tions changed. Presumably the trending petitions captured more signatures at the expense of
non-trending petitions, but the Gini coefficient cannot measure this directly. We now test this
hypothesis directly with a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which is where a regression
on the outcome using observations around the cut point can estimate the impact of the vari-
able of interest [12]. The top trending petitions were shown in a 2-column, 3-row grid with the
option to click a link to expose petitions in positions 7–12 (Fig 1). In order for the RD design
to be appropriate, it must not be possible for any person to control which petitions trend or
the positions at which they trend. Our data satisfies this condition as each user could only sign
a petition once, and users did not know how many others would sign the same petition or
another petition. We compare the signatures petitions in adjacent positions receive while
trending on the homepage, and the important difference in outcomes is between petitions
being placed in different positions (something any individual person would have little control
over).
Fig 3. The daily distribution of signatures to petitions before and after the introduction of the trending facility.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g003
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Our analysis here differs from a classic RD design in three ways. First, the number of signa-
tures a petition receives is a discrete variable; so, we use the generalization of the RD design for
discrete values used in Narayanan et al. [55]. Second, the position of a petition is determined by
the number of signatures in the hour prior to trending while we measure the number of signa-
tures in the hour while trending, and we cannot assume independence between these values
and thus seek to compare the change in growth for each petition above its mean. Finally, we
only observe trending petitions once an hour while the list is updated continuously in real time.
Fig 5 shows the difference in the raw number of signatures petitions in adjacent positions
receive within one hour. The graph shows 95% confidence intervals in the difference in the
raw number of signatures petitions in adjacent positions receive while trending. Petitions in
position one, for instance, receive 66–74 more signatures in the hour while trending than peti-
tions trending in position two. This effect diminishes rapidly for lower positions.
This analysis, however, does not take into account the differences among individual peti-
tions. The petition in position one is in that position precisely because it is receiving more sig-
natures than the petition in position 2. To control for these differences, we calculate the mean
number of signatures for each petition over a number of hours before it trends. Fig 6 compares
the number of signatures each petition receives above its 18-hour mean for adjacent positions.
The graph shows 95% confidence intervals in the difference between petitions trending in
adjacent positions simultaneously, but first subtracts from each petition its mean number of
signatures for the 18 hours prior to trending in order to control for the individual variation of
petitions. The results are stable for windows of other sizes larger than 18 hours.
Within the limitations detailed above, our analysis shows that the trending petitions facility
did concentrate attention and signatures on trending petitions, but also that it did so
Fig 4. The effect of a change in design on the Gini coefficient.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g004
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differently depending on the positions of the petitions. That is, we find that the petition trend-
ing in the first position received 3.8 to 11.3 more signatures above its per hour mean than the
petition trending in the second position. Similar, a move from position 4 to position 3 was
associated with 0.2 to 2.1 more signatures above the petition’s per hour mean. The differences
between other adjacent positions are not statistically significant.
While the trending facility did concentrate signatures, it did so only for petitions in the first
few positions. It may seem strange that there are significant effects for moving from position 2
to position 1 and from position 4 to position 3, but not for moving from position 3 to position
2. We suspect the two-column layout is responsible for this oddity. Human-Computer Interac-
tion studies using eye-tracking suggest users of search engines, for example, fixate on the
results in the top position and then skim down the left side of the page (at least for users with
left-to-right languages) [56]). This tendency to skim down the left side of the page means peti-
tions in the left column (positions 1, 3, and 5) could have stood out more than petitions in the
right column (positions 2, 4, and 6) and likely explains why a move from position 3 (on the
left) to position 2 (on the right) had no significant effect.
Fig 5. Comparisons of raw signatures in adjacent positions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g005
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Overall, our results provide a field test for the provision of social information and find that
the trending petition information concentrated attention to the top few ranked petitions. We
expected to find a significant difference between petitions in positions 6 and 7, because posi-
tion 6 appeared in the bottom right of the trending petition information while viewing posi-
tion 7 required a further click to ‘see additional trending petitions.’ However, attention is so
concentrated on the first few positions that we find no significant difference between petitions
in positions 6 and 7.
The analysis of positions in combination with that of overall signature growth and the Gini
coefficient show that the addition of the trending petitions facility resulted in trending peti-
tions receiving more signatures and that these signatures came at the expense of signatures to
other petitions on the site (thus the change in the Gini coefficient while the overall number of
signatures per day did not increase), validating H2. Simply put, the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer.
Such a result shows evidence of the heavy-tailed distributions that crop up so often in Inter-
net-based distributions, where social information is available about which online initiatives are
Fig 6. Comparisons of difference from 18-hour means in adjacent positions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g006
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popular. In this case, however, the implications of this result are somewhat surprising. It sug-
gests that some people come to the homepage of the petition platform looking for petitions to
sign, or that they come to a specific petition on the site and then move on to the homepage
looking for other petitions that interest them. This corresponds to Wright’s finding of ‘super-
participants’ [45] and Huang et al.’s findings with ‘power users’ [47] who sign many petitions.
These people have a zero-sum attention capacity: they will sign a certain number of petitions,
but this number does not appear to have increased after the trending facility was introduced;
so, if a particular petition attracts their attention, they will sign that one at the exclusion of
another that they otherwise might have signed. As a result of the concentration of signatures,
the number of the most successful petitions (petitions above the 100,000 signatures threshold)
increased from 3 to 14 after the introduction of the trending information as shown in Fig 7.
Understanding the impact of social information
This evidence that people are coming to petition sites just to ‘find something to sign’ (rather
than coming to sign a petition on a specific issue) suggests a general desire for political engage-
ment—the ‘aimless surfing’ identified by Borge and Cardenal [14]—without a firm view as to
Fig 7. Comparisons of the total number of signatures that petitions received before and after the introduction of the trending petitions facility.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196068.g007
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what the engagement should be about. These individuals are not completely aimless surfers,
however, because they know what they want to do, that is, to sign a petition. To understand
this observation further, we use anonymous analytics data for December 2012 to April 2014
provided by the UK Government Digital Service. However, we cannot match the analytics
data (which relates to user visits to the site) with the petition data (which relates to petition sig-
natories), and in any case the analytics data does not include the time that the platform was
changed.
First, we look at the overall traffic sources to the website. Close to 40 per cent is directed
from Facebook (two thirds of which is from the mobile version), 10 per cent from Twitter, and
10 per cent from Google organic search results. We analysed the flow of the users in order to
investigate how many users saw the trending petitions information on the homepage and from
where those users came. To check the stability of the forthcoming measurements, we repeated
them for a shorter period of 6 months starting from December 2012. The results are all broadly
similar with differences only in the decimal digits, and we therefore conclude that the results
are stable at the reported precision.
Overall, about 3.5 per cent of all the visits to the website start at the homepage displaying
the trending petitions information. If we look at the traffic sources of this 3.5 per cent, we
observe a very different pattern compared to the overall visits: only 6 per cent of this 3.5 per
cent is sourced from Facebook (equally from mobile and desktop) while Twitter is only
responsible for 2 per cent of this direct traffic to the front page. About 44 per cent of the visits
starting at the homepage originated from Google and 30 per cent of them were direct visits (by
users who had typed the web address of the petition site directly into their browsers, book-
marked the page, or clicked a link in an email). That many users starting at the homepage
came from Google is not surprising, considering that the first search result in Google for the
keyword ‘petition’ directed to this page for users in the UK.
These observations explain the previous findings on the effect of the design change: a con-
siderable number of users just go to the website directly or search for the petition website on
Google, without aiming at a certain petition. We may think of these users as aimless petition-
ers. Apart from this group who visit the homepage and the trending petition information
directly, almost 10 per cent of all the first clicks within the website (that is, by users who arrived
at a page other than the homepage on the site) lead users to the homepage (with the trending
petition information). Eventually, a consistent number of site visits include viewing the trend-
ing petition information on the homepage, including some users who sign a petition and then
visit the homepage. Overall, this led to 2.35 million visits to the homepage (1.40 million unique
visitors) out of the 63.6 million page views on the site overall (47.1 million unique page visits)
during the period of traffic analysis. There were about 5.9 million visit sessions with at least
one interaction with the site content. We estimate that about 40 per cent of all these sessions
passed through the homepage at some point.
Using these numbers it is possible to estimate the theoretical maximum amount of change
in the Gini coefficient. The first order approximation of the amount of change in the Gini coef-
ficient Δg, is equal to (1 − g0)(ΔN/N) where g0 is the Gini coefficient without social information
and ΔN/N is the fraction of influenced visitors. By plugging in the values of g0 = 0.85 and ΔN/
N = 0.40 (we assume all users to the homepage are influenced by the trending information and
sign one of the top few petitions), we find that the maximum theoretical value for Δg is 0.06.
Thus, the theoretical maximum amount of change in the Gini coefficient of the signature
distribution that we would expect to see due to the social influence is about 6 per cent, which is
in agreement with the amount of change in the Gini coefficient that we observed in the signa-
ture data (0.07), indicating that the effects of the local treatment is very strong and almost
every user receiving the social information is influenced. (We remind the reader that the traffic
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data and the petition signature data come from different time periods and the theoretical value
is only an approximation).
The results clearly show that an increase in the salience of social information increases the
skew of the distribution. Thus part of the pervasiveness of heavy-tailed distributions on Inter-
net-based platforms may be due to the prevalence of social information on such platforms. As
discussed further in the next section, the Gini coefficient on the petition platform was high to
start likely due to social information elsewhere on the petition platform as well as on the many
social media platforms through which petitions are disseminated.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have analysed new data on political behaviour to investigate social informa-
tion effects in a digital environment, suggesting that some citizens are using the Internet for
generalized (rather than issue-based) civic engagement and showing how the design of Inter-
net-based participation platforms can have significant effects on individuals’ political behav-
iours. We have examined the results from a natural experiment, where the effect of platform
design changes can be observed and explained. We have verified the importance of social
information by showing that information about the participation of others—trending infor-
mation—can have an important effect on those who are exposed to it. Now that so much of
political participation takes place in digital contexts where people are invited to make low-cost
‘micro-donations’ of time and effort to political causes as they go about their daily lives on
social media [10], social information is more abundant, and we can expect that social informa-
tion effects of this kind will be more prevalent than in offline contexts where decisions to par-
ticipate tend to be larger, more ‘lumpy,’ and harder to influence (and therefore less likely to be
influenced by weak informational cues).
Our findings also suggest that social information in the form of trending information can
exacerbate turbulence in political mobilization [10]. The most popular petitions receive more
signatures than one would expect just by virtue of their popularity, and in this zero-sum race
for collective attention, those for which there is no evidence of popularity receive fewer signa-
tures than their popularity would indicate. In this way we have observed for political behaviour
similar effects to those observed for cultural markets [30, 31], where experimental subjects
were shown varying information about the popularity of otherwise unknown songs and were
asked to rate them. Subjects were more likely to rate highly those songs for which there was
evidence of popularity, meaning that the information injected a source of instability into cul-
tural markets.
As mentioned already in reference to the two-column layout, small changes in the display
of social information and the user interface may have significant impacts (as has been found
for the display of comment threads [57]). The UK petition platform only let users sign peti-
tions one at a time, and users had to re-enter their details (name, postcode, email address) sep-
arately for each petition they wished to sign. Specific deadlines, different calculations to
determine which petitions are shown as trending, and other changes may weaken or
strengthen the concentration of signatures.
We expect that this finding could be generalized beyond petition signing to other forms of
political participation or support for political parties, as these kinds of popularity indicators
are present in some form by default on most social media platforms. On Twitter, for example,
it is possible to see immediately how many followers someone has, how many times a tweet
has been liked or retweeted, and view trending topics. On Facebook, any post will show infor-
mation about the number of ‘likes’ or other ‘reactions’ it has received, and global trending
news is also shown. YouTube videos show the number of views and subscribers, and so on. It
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could be that these platforms—to greater or lesser extent according to their designs—are
thereby contributing to the apparent rise in populism across Europe, the US, and other coun-
tries. It remains an open question for further research, as is the question of whether new plat-
forms with very different presentations of social information (such as Snapchat, which does
not show the number of followers or friends) create different effects and thereby feed into dif-
ferent distributions or whether people have other ways of working out social information from
these platforms.
The importance of social media in disseminating petitions was illustrated through analysis
of the analytics data we used in the previous section, which showed that around two thirds of
all visitors to the petitions site arrived via either Twitter or Facebook. Further research could
investigate the influence of the design of these alternative platforms, and how social informa-
tion is presented within those designs, on the likelihood of petitions being disseminated and,
ultimately, signed. Future work could compare the dissemination of petitions on Twitter,
Facebook, or Instagram to their dissemination on a platform where there is little social infor-
mation, such as Snapchat (which is increasingly popular amongst younger age groups). Such
research would complement work that examines the connective appeal of Internet interactions
[58] or explores the discursive potential of petition sites through design (e.g., [59, 60]). How-
ever, the closed nature of many of these platforms presents a serious challenge due to the lack
of data available for research. The ease of obtaining data from Twitter, which has an open
Application Programming Interface (API), is why this platform receives disproportionate lev-
els of scholarly attention.
These findings have policy implications. The digital team in the Cabinet Office that devel-
oped the petition platform believed that the design change that introduced trending informa-
tion would bring more people to sign petitions, but would not make any difference to which
petitions they signed. In fact, the reverse was true, which indicates the importance of under-
standing the impact of design on behaviour for platforms geared at civic engagement. As dis-
cussed above, social information has been shown over decades of social science research to
be an important driver of participation (see [10] for a review); so, we expected that if it was
changed, behaviour would also change, but policy-makers will not necessarily be social scien-
tists. This finding also illustrates the importance of testing design changes before they are fully
implemented. Private firms offering services and products online—and indeed social media
platforms themselves—continually run A/B tests, whereby different versions of a website are
offered randomly to users and the effects on user behaviour measured and observed. Although
officials we spoke to mentioned A/B testing was a tool being used within the Government Dig-
ital Service, it was not used for this particular design change.
The observation that some people come to the petition platform looking for something to
sign is a further indicator of the importance of social information. These ‘aimless petitioners’
will be even more susceptible to whatever information or signals are presented to them on the
platform than people directed to the site via links to specific petitions. Signing a petition on a
digital platform is just one example of a ‘tiny act’ of participation (see [10]). These micro-contri-
butions require less resources than any traditional act of participation and are drawing citizens
with different demographics than traditionally assumed as politically active into mobilizations
(for example, people from lower socio-economic groups, the ‘time-poor,’ and those with less
interest in politics), which corresponds to other findings in this field [14, 15, 39]. Their deci-
sions about which petitions to sign will be more easily shaped by information cues than those
who come to the site looking for specific petitions or issues. Tiny acts may be amplified later as
making small Internet-based contributions to political causes seems to lead to more substantive
contributions (for example in the Obama election campaigns [61]). These findings make under-
standing the mechanisms that shape tiny acts (such as platform design) even more important.
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